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PANEL DISCUSSION
Professor Charles . McManis,' after an initial observation, posed the
following two questions to Professor Winter.-
My first question grows out of my confusion over the plane on which
Professor Winter's critique of the welfare state is taking place; that is to
say, is the critique simply a judgment on whether the pursuit of distribu-
tive equality is a sound policy and thus basically a political critique, or is
it a critique made from a constitutional plane? Part of Professor Winter's
assessment of the ultimate consequences of our current welfare state is
that it leads not only to economic dislocations in the private sector, but
also to paralysis in the political branches of government. He also suggests
that to a certain extent the paralysis has already begun to take hold,
which makes a political solution unlikely. On the other hand, he de-
nounces judicial activism, at least when aimed at promoting further social
and economic equality. . .. In view of this double-barreled critique of
the welfare state and judicial activism, what is the role of the courts in
response to the sorry state of affairs just described?
My second question concerns Professor Winter's repeated references to
the public and private sectors. It's not altogether clear to me that the
public-private sector distinction is a particularly meaningful one, at least
not as a description of the world as it is, and thus, I would like to posit a
substitute simply for purposes of comparison. John Kenneth Galbraith,
in his recent book, Economics and the Public Purpose,2 describes a three-
constituent universe: the public sector, as we have been talking about it;
and a two-constituent private sector. One constituent of the private sector
he describes as the market system, in which market forces still operate,
and the other he describes as the planning system, or that portion of the
private sector which has achieved a degree of control over market forces.
These two systems exist in the private sector side-by-side-separate and
now unequal. The planning system has as much in common with what
we traditionally describe as the public sector as it does with what we tra-
ditionally describe as the private sector. Without attributing any of what
follows to Galbraith, I would like to suggest how we arrived at the sorry
state of affairs that Professor Winter described.
The inescapable fact is that big business preceded big government. The
present shape of our public sector, moreover, is in no small measure the
1. Associate Professor of Law, Washington University. A.B., 1964, Birmingham-Southern
College; M.A., J.D., 1972, Duke University.
2. J. GALBRAITH, ECONOMIES AND THE PUBLIC PUPPOSE (1973).
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result of judicial activism of the last century, which actively promoted
rapid economic development and the corporate form of business-a form
of business that, significantly, requires active government intrusion into
the private sector to exist. Without laws to limit the liability of sharehold-
ers, there would be no corporate form of government. A second ines-
capable fact is that a tremendous inequality exists in the private sector
between the market system and the planning system. Much of the legisla-
tive measures that have been criticized and even some of the judicial ac-
tivism that Professor Winter criticized is, in fact, government's attempt to
deal with that inequality and its own adverse economic, social, and politi-
cal effects on our system. For example, he attributed inflation to the gov-
ernment's printing of money, but I would suggest that the significant part
of our private sector that has power over its own prices accounts in part,
at least, for the problem. Similarly, Professor Winter attributed voter dis-
affection to the growth and power of the bureaucracy in the public sector,
but I would suggest that the disaffection stems in part, at least, from the
growth and power of the planning system within the traditionally private
sector of our society and the resulting feeling of powerlessness individuals
have in the market system.
So, in a word, I would like to present Professor Winter with this three-
constituent universe and an alternative explanation for why we have ar-
rived at the welfare state. If you want to "uninvent" big government, you
have to "uninvent" big business first.
Professor Winter responded
I must say, that's the kind of speech that has gotten us where we are.
There abound all kinds of studies about market concentration that chal-
lenge the view that our economy is somehow subject to enormous
amounts of monopoly power. . . . I give you just one example of this
kind of mythology, which continues to survive and haunt us in this soci-
ety. . . . [It has been charged that] the oil companies-the Seven Sis-
ters-have been selling oil at a monopolistic price for years, and through
the control of oil have exerted enormous power over our economy. ...
Now OPEC has come into being and quadrupled the price of oil. I put it
to you-if you know any economics-that if the oil companies until that
time had a monopoly on the sale of oil, there would have been no way
that OPEC could have quadrupled the price and made more money. The
evidence is that [the pre-OPEC price] was at a competitive low. . ..
As to inflation, I do not see how a monopoly causes it. Suppose that
fifteen monopolies govern our economy and they continue to raise prices.
That does not cause inflation. If anything, it will cause a recession, as the
[Vol. 1979:787
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OPEC price increase did, because money will be diverted out of other
sectors of the economy, which will experience a downturn. There is no
way that you can hang inflation on that sort of thing.
There is a gray area where government and business work in combina-
tion, and there is no question that it poses a threat. . . . But it cannot, I
think, be justifiably called the private sector; I call it a kind of concealed
intrusion of the public sector.
Professor Choper, responding to a question on how Shelley v. Krae-
mer3 differedfrom a mere action to enforce a contract.
Shelley v. Kraemer represented something more than neutral state en-
forcement of a contract through which the parties engaged in racial dis-
crimination. The kind of contract involved in Shelley was not an
ordinary contract; it was a contract that restrained the alienation of real
property.
With an ordinary contract, a court generally does not look to the nature
of the contract, but simply to whether a contract existed, and if so, en-
forces it irrespective of the court's approval or disapproval of the sub-
stance of the contract. A court hesitates to enforce a contract in restraint
of alienation, however, unless it finds the particular restraint reasonable
and consistent with public policy so as to overcome the normal presump-.
tion against restraints. To enforce the contract, therefore, the court must
express its substantive approval of the particular kind of restraint.
This sort of approval in Shelley might well be seen as representing a
judgment very similar to one that a legislature would make in enacting a
state statute that required racial limitations on the transfer of property.
That is the way in which Shelley v. Kraemer may be more than an ordi-
nary contract enforcement case. It involved plaintiff's request for special
approval by the state court to violate the constitutional norm-the prohi-
bition of discrimination against minority races.
Professor Choper then answered a followup question on whether the
state court action in Shelley, which enjoined Shelley from takingposses-
sion of the property subject to the restrictive covenant, constituted state
action:
I don't know quite how far I want to generalize this. I would say that if
a state court imposes its own judgment which violates a constitutional
norm-puts its imprimatur on a particular policy-then that amounts to
3. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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unconstitutional state action. I have not thought through all possible ar-
eas, but I do know that enforcement in Shelley of a restraint on alienation
of property. . . would have placed the state's imprimatur on racial dis-
crimination much more so than if the court had simply enforced an ordi-
nary contract. If Professor Winter and I, in contrast, made a contract that
neither of us would employ black people and I broke that contract, his
suit on the contract would not involve this notion of restraints on aliena-
tion of property. Our agreement would be an ordinary contract.
Professor Winter."
I am not sure that I agree with the proposition that employers can,
under the fourteenth amendment, freely agree not to hire blacks.
Professor Choper."
I was suggesting a different theory.
Professor Winter-
I understand, but suppose that two very large employers in an area, at
the behest of an all-white union, agreed with the union and with each
other not to hire blacks.
Professor Choper."
I would suggest that you may not need two; that even one sufficiently
large employer could be a monopolistic force in employment opportuni-
ties, and thus its action would constitute state action.
Professor Winter."
Well, all right, if the reason for not liking a restraint on alienation is
that it cannot be eroded by competitive forces. That is why I think you
can call Shelley a state action case without getting into balancing [the
interests on the side of the claim to equality with those on the side of
enforcing the restrictive covenant]. I think the questioner has a very good
point: if you find state action every time the court balances interests, you
may open up an area without easily identifiable outer limits.
Professor Choper, in response to a question on why the issue is not one
offreedom of contract-
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If Professor Winter and I contract to do or not do something and one of
us allegedly breaks the contract and the other seeks to enforce it, I don't
think any constitutional freedom of contract issues are involved. We had
freedom to contract . [without any restraint] on us analogous to the
ordinary presumption against restraints on alienation.
Professor Winter-
Professor Choper's point, I take it, is that the law, particularly antitrust
law, distinguishes between contracts in which two people agree to ex-
change something and contracts in which two competitors agree to deal
with third parties only on certain terms. Views may differ on what to do
about the latter type of contract because it may break up of its own force.
But certainly, in the case of land and mutual covenants that run with
land, the land will always be there. Shelley thus seems to be a paramount
case for the Court to hold that private activity is, in effect, state action
when it so closely resembles a government.
Professor MeManis, addressing a question to Professor Winter.*
If you do not advocate judicial activism to cut back on the welfare
state, yet you think that the political branches are paralyzed, what do we
do? Call a constitutional convention?
Professor Winter.-
One thing we might attempt to do is draft a constitutional amendment
that would somehow limit federal spending. I am convinced that we can
draft a workable amendment in the state government to limit state spend-
ing, but I foresee a number of problems with an amendment to the federal
constitution to limit federal spending. One problem, yet unsolved by pro-
ponents of a federal spending limit amendment, is the power of the fed-
eral government over expenditures just through regulation. If OSHA can
compel expenditures by employers in the interest ofjob safety, the federal
government could run a national health program through laws regulating
private insurance companies. . . . My query is whether that kind of regu-
lation, which compels expenditures in the private sector, may not be less
efficient than direct government spending. What I am afraid of is that we
might wind up in a situation in which government spending in the
broadest sense grows larger than ever because Congress, under the con-
straints of a spending limit, chooses to do indirectly what it could no
longer do directly-force private parties to spend. Until that problem is
Number 3]
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solved, I cannot come out in favor of a constitutional amendment to limit
federal spending.
A member of the audience asked each member of thepanel to discuss
whether either state or federal regulations should be promulgated to pro-
hibit discrimination in private clubs.
Professor Choper
This question raises a difficult constitutional issue: do members of an
organization have a constitutionally protected right to engage in discrimi-
nation that violates the constitutional norm? That is the first hurdle to be
overcome. Certain Supreme Court opinions quite recently-Runyon v.
McCrary4 is one-suggest this possibility for members of private clubs.
A further question arises if there is no constitutional right to discrimi-
nate, but neither Congress nor the state legislatures pass antidiscrimina-
tion statutes: should the Court on its own find that discrimination by
private clubs, or the like, amounts to state action in violation of the four-
teenth amendment? This question tests the notion of when a privately
developed monopoly with sufficient exclusionary force may be justifiably
brought under the restrictions of the fourteenth amendment.
This statement of the principle requires some qualification; namely,
that the monopoly must employ its exclusionary force against some-
thing-and I don't know that I can do any better than this-something
quite "important" or "fundamental." I think it has to be more, for exam-
ple, than the ability to play golf on a lovely golf course. Perhaps the
power to exclude, however, may not extend to playing golf period; that is,
if the only three golf courses in a particular area all excluded blacks or
women or some other suspect group. Another issue concerning the ques-
tion of whether the exclusionary power involves something "important" is
whether this is a subjectively or objectively determined fact. Suppose the
discriminated-against golfer alleges: "The most challenging of the three
golf courses that exists in this community excludes blacks; therefore, I am
effectively excluded from playing the kind of golf that I want to play." I
think that puts a nice question. What constitutes a sufficient exclusionary
force?
Margaret Bush Wilson.-
Obviously, if the public accommodation laws apply, then we have no
4. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
[Vol. 1979:787
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1979/iss3/10
PANEL DISCUSSION
problems; it's the private aspect that is troublesome. Just recently, we
have seen a situation in which key leaders in a community made informal
decisions in a private club. At that point a strong feeling existed that a
significant nonprivate aspect was present; that we have the additional fac-
tor that makes the situation one in which there is need for some disci-
pline. That's as far as I can go. The problem plagues us and we have no
easy answers.
Professor Choper."
I think that you have begun to develop the notion of what is sufficient
exclusionary power in respect to some important interest that people
have. If a private club is the place to do business effectively with city
officials, then you have gone several steps, at least, to find that the organi-
zation does present the sort of monopolistic force that we have been dis-
cussing.
Professor Dixon, the moderator, observed.-
Sufficient exclusionary power is very hard to measure under a stan-
dardized rule. Perhaps that is the key problem.
Professor Winter-
Public accommodation laws raise other issues; for example, the issue of
the continuing public insult on enterprises of a particular size and obvi-
ousness that engage in racist behavior. I certainly do not see any major
reason not to force country clubs and other organized recreational facili-
ties to abide by any public accommodations law. It seems to me that the
costs of antidiscrimination legislation do not become very high until the
prohibition really invades the home. The costs become high then only
because the insult-the public insult-is no longer obvious. I don't see
any reason why we should not limit racism to the home where its impact
is limited, where it is clear that it is idiosyncratic behavior, and where it is
not a statement by the society. So I think the problem is more than one of
monopoly; it is also a problem of imminence. Even if, for example, a
large country club did admit blacks openly, it would not solve for me the
problem of whether there should be a law that prohibits discrimination by
all of them.
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